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REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Lori Busche ("Lori") argues that Matthias Busche ("Matthias") has failed to 
marshal the evidence in support of the findings of fact entered by the District court, and 
due to this failure that all findings of fact ought to be deemed adequately supported by the 
evidence. Rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure requires that a party 
"challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that supports the 
challenged finding." U.R.A.P. 24(a)(9). Matthias has argued that the trial court failed to 
consider the statutory requirements of Utah Code Ann § 78-45-7.2(7)(b) (2007) 
(renumbered 2008). There are no findings made by the court regarding consideration of 
the statutory requirements to consider employment opportunities in addition to work 
history, occupational qualifications, etc. Because no findings exist related to the 
consideration of employment opportunities Matthias cannot marshal facts related to 
findings which were not made by the court. 
Matthias' challenge of the determination that Matthias is voluntarily 
under-employed is based upon the trial court's use of legally insufficient evidence. The 
deposition of Tom Black, admitted solely for impeachment purposes, is what the court 
based its finding of voluntary under-employment upon. (R. 1031, Trial Transcript 
p.l37:3-25, 138:1-4, 139:3-4, 141:24-25, 142:1-25, 143:1-2). This evidence was 
marshaled by Matthias. None of the other determinations by the court related to income 
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have been challenged. This evidence regarding Matthias' termination is legally 
insufficient to make a finding of voluntary under-employment. No substantive evidence 
was presented to the court which would support a finding of voluntary 
under-employment, as the evidence relied upon was admitted for impeachment purposes 
only. 
Without legally sufficient evidence to support the finding of voluntary under 
employment the court abused its discretion and the decision ought to be overturned by the 
court of Appeals. The trial court incorrectly determined that Matthias was voluntarily 
under-employed and incorrectly imputed income to Matthias. 
The trial court's failure to apply the correct version of the statute, and the failure to 
consider the relevant statutory factors prior to imputation of income also constituted plain 
error which ought to be reversed. The procedural changes in the statute ought to be 
retroactively applied, and the correct version of the statute used. 
ARGUMENT 
L MATTHIAS PRESENTED EVIDENCE SHOWING THAT THE 
FINDINGS RELATED TO VOLUNTARY UNDEREMPLOYMENT 
WERE BASED UPON LEGALLY INSUFFICNET EVIDENCE 
A. The Evidence Used By the Trial court Was Marshaled and is 
Legally Insufficient to Support a Finding of Voluntary 
Under-Employment 
Matthias has shown that the evidence used to conclude that he was voluntarily 
under-employed was legally insufficient to reach such a conclusion. The "Statement of 
2 
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Facts" presented by Matthias outlines the evidence considered by the trial court to 
determine that Matthias is voluntarily under-employed. Matthias does not challenge the 
findings related to his current income, work history, or his efforts to find new 
employment. The challenge to the finding of voluntary under employment is based upon 
the court's reliance upon evidence not admitted for their truth, but rather for impeachment 
purposes. 
Matthias' work history and salary were considered by the court. The fact that 
Matthias "sent out 30-40 resumes" was considered. (R. 0997, Findings of Fact and 
Amended Decree of Divorce, 121; R. 1034, Trial Transcript, p. 34:23-25, 35:1-13). 
Matthias' current employment was also considered. The voluntary underemployment 
determination was based upon the finding by the court that the termination from Morinda 
was due to a termination for cause. 
Matthias' current income is undisputed. He does argue that the finding of 
voluntary under-employment, based upon a termination for cause, is based upon legally 
insufficient evidence. The court of Appeals has given guidance regarding legal 
insufficiency and stated that "examples of legal insufficiency might include.. .,[a] 
document that was used for impeachment only and had not been admitted as substantive 
evidence,..." Kimball v. Kimball 2009 UT App 233, ]f 20 n.5. 
The trial court's findings that Matthias was terminated for cause were based upon 
the deposition of Tom Black and his affidavit that were used only for impeachment 
3 
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purposes. This evidence was not admitted for its truth. Mr. Black failed to appear at the 
trial, despite the subpoena requiring his presence. Matthias did not have the opportunity 
to cross-examine Mr. Black. Absent the deposition of Tom Black the court had no 
evidence with which it could support the finding that Matthias was voluntarily 
under-employed based upon a termination for cause. 
B. Matthias is not Required to Marshal Evidence Which is not 
Challenged 
The evidence presented related to Matthias' current income and employment are 
undisputed. The marshaling requirement allows for a meaningful review of challenged 
facts, but parties are not required to marshal undisputed facts. Matthias is not asking that 
the findings related to his current income and employment be set aside. It is undisputed 
that his current income is substantially less than his previous employment. 
Neither party is challenging Matthias' current income, or employment. The 
challenge to the factual findings rests upon the court's finding that Matthias was 
terminated for cause and that it was this termination that formed the basis for the finding 
of voluntary under-employment. Matthias has met the marshaling requirement and 
shown the evidence relied upon to support the finding is legally insufficient to support a 
finding of voluntary under-employment. 
II. THE COURT COMMITTED REVERSABLE ERROR WHEN IT 
IMPLIEDLY FOUND TERMIATION FOR CAUSE 
A, Hall v. Hall is Applicable to the Present Case 
4 
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Despite Lori's arguments to the contrary Hall v. Hall 858 P.2d 1018 (Utah App. 
1993) is applicable. In Hall and the present case, the finding of under-employment was 
based upon insufficient findings by the trial court. Similar to Hall, the trial court found 
that Matthias was currently earning less than he was previously earning. In the present 
case the court did not enter findings related to Matthias' employment capacity and earning 
potential. There were no evidence presented, and no findings entered, which showed 
that Matthias is voluntarily under-employed at a level below what he is capable of 
earning. The court did not enter findings related to the statutory factors and absent such 
findings the court could not logically conclude that Matthias was under-employed. Just 
like in Hall the trial court did not answer the questions related to Matthias' abilities, if his 
current salary is below the prevailing market for a person with his abilities, or if there are 
job openings for a person with his abilities. Id. At 1025. None of those findings were 
made by the trial court related to Matthias' current employment. 
Lori claims that the trial court considered the factors stated in Hall and that this is 
sufficient. The trial court found that at his current job Matthias earned less than he is 
presently earning. This is one of the factors articulated in Hall, but as stated in Hall, this 
was only "one element in the matrix of factual issues affecting the ultimate finding of 
whether Appellant is underemployed." Id. As previously discussed, the only evidence 
that should have been considered by the court, related to the loss of employment, is 
legally insufficient to support a finding of under-employment. 
5 
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The court discussed the fact that Matthias sent out resumes in an effort to find 
other employment, but made no findings related to the reasonableness of these efforts, 
whether the employment opportunities available were beneath his qualifications, whether 
Matthias passed up higher paying jobs when he took the current job, or his earning 
potential. No findings were made regarding the minimum standards set in Hall regarding 
Matthias' "employment capacity and earnings potential." Id. The findings the court 
made were that Matthias earned more at his previous job than he is earning at his present 
job. There was no finding that his current salary is below what it should be for a person 
with his abilities. 
Because the court failed to consider the relevant factors related to Matthias' 
employment, and the evidence considered by the court related to Matthias' termination is 
not sufficient to support the finding, the determination that Matthias is voluntarily 
under-employed was in error. 
B. Connell v. Connell is Distinguishable 
Lori argues that Connell v. Connell 2010 UT App 139, is directly on point with the 
present case. In support of this argument she claims that the trial court's imputation of 
$5,996 per month, when Mr. Connell was earning $5,000 per month at his present job 
controls the present case. What Lori fails to address is the fact that findings of the trial 
court in Connell existed regarding Mr. Connell's forced resignation. Additionally, 
6 
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evidence existed that Mr. Connell had historically earned significantly more than even the 
$5,996 which he was imputed. Id. at f 14. 
In discussing the reasons behind allowing the court to impute income if voluntary 
under-employment is found the court of Appeals has stated that the reason "is to prevent 
parents from reducing their child support or alimony by purposeful unemployment or 
underemployment." Id. at f 16, quoting Griffith v. Griffith, 959 R2d 1015, 1018 (Utah 
Ct. App 1998). The evidence before the trial court in the present case regarding 
Matthias' termination, as has previously been argued, was legally insufficient. 
In Connell the court had sufficient evidence before it to make findings that Mr. 
Connell was voluntarily under-employed, and even with this finding that he was 
voluntarily under-employed he was not imputed income at his highest historical income 
earned during the marriage. 
III. THE COURT COMMITTED REVERSABLE ERROR WHEN IT 
FAILED TO APPLY THE CORRECT VERSION OF THE STATUTE. 
A. The Correct Version of the Statute Should be Applied 
Lori arguers that amended statutes can only be retroactively applied to a pending 
action, and then argues that the present matter was not pending because the trial had 
concluded. Lori concedes that the memorandum decision had not been entered by the 
court prior to the statute's amendment. Therefore, the case remained pending. The 
matter had not concluded, as no final order had been entered by the court. 
Because U.C.A. § 78-45-7.5(7) (amended and renumbered as §78B-12-203(7)), 
7 
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which specifies the requirements for a court: to impute income to a party, had been 
amended prior to the issuance of the memorandum decision, and no substantive rights 
were affected, the court ought to have applied the correct version of the statute. The 
legislature's amendment of the statute, which provided specification of the methods used 
by the court to determine whether income ought to be imputed to a party, is a procedural 
change in the statute, and does not change the substantive rights of the parties. 
B. The Statutory Amendment Does Not Constitute a Change in the 
Substantive Rights of the Parties 
The Utah Supreme court has stated the general principle that retroactivity is not 
favored in the law. Goebel v. Salt Lake City R. Co., 104 P.3d 1185, 1198, ^  39 (Utah 
2004) (quoting Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988)). More 
specifically, it is clearly established in the law that amendments that affect substantive 
rights do not apply retroactively. Homeside Lending, Inc., v. Miller, 31 P.3d 607, 615, \ 
47 (Utah Ct. App. 2001) (quoting Thronson v. Thronson, 810 P.2d 428, 432 (Ut. Ct. App. 
1991). The Utah Supreme court has also stated that "[a] statute is considered procedural 
or remedial, as opposed to substantive, if the statute does not enlarge, eliminate, or 
destroy vested rights." Smith v. Cook, 803 P.2d 788, 792 (Utah 1990). 
In Goebel, plaintiff sued a municipal entity for negligence causing personal injury. 
Goebel, 104 P.3d at 1189, TJ 4. Plaintiff served notice on the mayor of the city, 
according to the notice requirements under the Governmental Immunity Act in force at 
the time of the accident. Id., j^ 37. However, in the meantime, the Legislature had 
8 
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amended the Governmental Immunity Act such that notice served was inadequate under 
the statute at the time of service. Id., If 3 8. While the court did hold that the amendment 
applied retroactively, it was careful to note that this was only permissible because it 
effected a change of procedural rights, and did nothing to alter a party's substantive 
rights. Id. That is, the retroactive effect was only permissible because it altered 
procedural, as opposed to substantive rights. Id. And in Smith, the court defined a 
change in substantive rights as one that would "enlarge, eliminate or destroy vested 
rights." Smith, 803 P.2d at 792 (emphasis added). None of the vested rights of the 
parties were affected by the change in the statutory language which required the court to 
consider employment opportunities along with the work history, occupation 
qualifications, and prevailing earnings for persons of similar backgrounds in the 
community, etc. 
The failure of the trial court to apply the correct version of the statute constitutes 
plain error which could not have been known to the parties at the time of trial. Had the 
correct version of the statute been applied, and proper consideration given to Matthias' 
current employment opportunities, the result of these findings would not have supported 
an imputation of income at the highest amount that Matthias had earned during the course 
of the marriage. 
IV. THE FAILURE TO REDUCE OR ELIMINATE MATTHIAS' 
ALIMONY OBLIGATION WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION 
9 
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Although the court does have discretion to select a method for determining 
income, the failure to make findings related to the award of alimony does constitute 
reversible error. The court is required to consider ability to pay when examining an 
award of alimony. See Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah 1985). In the present 
case it is undisputed that Matthias' income was substantially reduced. The Court found 
that Matthias income was less than he was presently making. The trial court then 
imputed income to Matthias and set the alimony award based upon this imputation of 
income. The reality is that Matthias does not have the ability to provide the alimony 
ordered by the court. This fact was acknowledged by the court, but despite the inability 
to pay, the Court refused to reduce the alimony award. 
The trial court found, and it was undisputed by the parties, that his income at the 
time of trial was $4,583 per month. A full 72% of his income is now ordered to go to 
child support and alimony. No findings were made regarding Matthias' tax liability, and 
the effect on his ability to pay, despite the requirement to do so. See Andrus v. Andrus, 
2007 UT App 291, \\1, 169 P.3d 754. Even if findings were made related to Matthias' 
ability to pay, which they were not, it is clear that such an award is inequitable and an 
abuse of discretion. The award is decision is simply not supported by the findings. 
Matthias clearly does not have an ability to pay based upon the findings. The refusal of 
the trial court to reduce Matthias' income is not supported by the findings and is 
reversible error. See Fish v. Fish, 2010 UT App 292 |^ 21. 
10 
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The simple fact that the court made findings that Matthias was employed and sent 
out 30-40 resumes after his termination do not constitute sufficient findings to determine 
that Matthias has an ability to provide alimony. The Court must consider the 
"employment potential and probably earnings used to determine the amount of income 
imputed to a spouse for purposes of determining alimony, 'from employment 
opportunities, work history, occupation qualifications, and prevailing earnings for persons 
of similar backgrounds in the community, or the median earnings for persons of similar 
backgrounds in the community, or the median earnings for persons in the same occupation 
in the same geographical area.5" Id. at ^ 20. This analysis was not done by the Court. 
Because the findings are inadequate, the refusal to reduce or eliminate the alimony award 
constitutes an abuse of discretion and the award ought to be overturned. 
V. THE COURT FAILED TO ENTER FINDINGS ON THE 
MANDATORY FACTORS RELATED TO AN AWARD OF 
ATTORNEY'S FEES 
Lori argues that the trial court addressed her needs related to attorney's fees and 
that the finding is sufficient to support the award. A single finding of need does not 
justify an award of attorney's fees without the other required findings related to 
reasonableness, and ability to pay. Lori fails to address the trial court's clear statement 
that the court was "aware that this decision will have catastrophic financial results" (R. 
0968, Memorandum Decision p. 18, section VII). It is clear from the findings that 
11 
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Matthias did not have the ability to pay attorney's fees, but the court entered the order 
despite the finding that such an award would be financially ruinous to Matthias. 
The court also found that Lori's attorney's fees were excessive. (Findings of Fact 
and Amended Decree of Divorce p. 21 ^74) The court's finding that the fees were 
excessive, coupled with the finding that such an award would devastate Matthias 
financially, cannot support an award of attorney's fees for the simple fact that the court 
found that Lori had a need. Lori is asking for an award of attorney's fees of $20,000 to 
be upheld, supported by findings that the fees were excessive, that Matthias had no ability 
to provide that amount, and that she had a need. Such an inequitable or unjust award 
ought not stand. See Young v. Young 2009 UT App 3, ^21, 201 P.3d 3014 (citing Wilde v. 
Wilde, 2001 UTApp 318 at Tf38). 
The failure by the court to consider the required factors, coupled with the 
inequitable and unjust award, and findings that attorney's fees were excessive and 
Matthias' inability to provide the fees, constitutes an abuse of discretion and the award 
should be overturned. 
VI. MATTHIAS APPEAL IS WELL TAKEN AND LORI SHOULD NOT 
BE AWARDED FEES ON APPEAL 
Lori concludes that this appear is frivolous and she ought to be awarded fees on 
appeal. She offers no support for her contention that the appeal is "not grounded in fact, 
nor warranted by existing law, or not based on a good faith argument to extend, modify or 
reverse existing law." Utah R. App. P. 33. The arguments presented in this appeal, 
12 
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coupled with the fact that the trial court found that the initial claims were not brought in 
bad faith, were not brought in bad faith. Matthias has shown that the arguments were 
grounded in fact and existing law. Therefore, an award of attorney's fees on appeal 
ought not stand. 
CONCLUSION 
Matthias respectfully requests that the alimony and child support award be 
overturned based upon a legally insufficient finding of voluntary under-employment. 
Despite the undisputed evidence of a substantial change in circumstances the trial court 
incorrectly imputed income to Matthias at a level that is not supported by the evidence 
and not based upon the proper statutory factors. The award of attorney's fees, despite 
findings of excessive fees and devastating consequences for Matthias also ought to be 
overturned. Principles of law, equity and fundamental fairness dictate that the orders 
entered by the trial court be reversed. 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF TO CROSS APPEAL 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
As previously discussed, the trial court's award of attorney's fees to Lori was error. 
The findings of the court related to Matthias' ability to pay and the reasonableness of the 
fees do not outweigh a single finding that Lori has a need for fees. 
Lori's argument that the trial court erred in finding that Matthias' equity interest in 
the marital home ought not be considered. It is within the broad discretion of the trial 
13 
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court to determine what constitutes income. Conversely it is also within the broad 
discretion of the trial court to exclude funds that it does not consider income. There is no 
argument made by Lori that the trial court did not consider the equity interest in the 
marital home. Lori's argument is that the equity was considered by the trial court, but 
that she disagrees with the refusal by the trial court, after consideration of the equity, to 
classify the equity interest in the home as ongoing income for purposes of attorney's fees. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT HAS DISCRETION TO CONSIDER 
MATTHIAS5 EQUITY INTEREST IN THE MARITAL HOME AND 
DETERMINE THAT IT IS NOT ONGOING INCOME 
The trial court did not find, as Lori contends, that the equity in the marital home 
cannot be considered assets or income. The court found that the "Respondent's equity in 
the marital home is not ongoing income and.. .that it is not appropriate to take the $66,000 
in equity Respondent is entitled to be used for his payment of Petitioner's attorney's fees." 
(Findings of Fact and Amended Decree of Divorce, Tf 77) The court did not conclude, 
despite Lori's argument, that as a matter of law that the equity could not be used in 
consideration of an award of attorney's fees. The court considered the equity and found 
that it was not ongoing income. The court was within its broad discretion to make this 
finding and to refuse to consider the equity in awarding attorney's fees. 
The finding of the court that the equity interest in the marital home is not ongoing 
income for purposes of ability to provide attorney's fees is within the sound discretion of 
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the court. See Stonehocker v. Stonehocker, 2008 UT App 11, f 10, 176 P.3d 476. Lori 
argues that the trial court is required to utilize the equity in the marital home to award 
attorney's fees. She then cites cases which discuss the ability of the court to consider 
other sources of funds for purposes of awarding attorney's fees. 
The Crompton case, cited by Lori, allows the court to consider income, but does 
not mandate the utilization of those funds for the finding of an ability to pay. Crompton 
v. Crompton, 888 P.2d 686 (Utah App. 1994). The court can exclude those funds if it so 
chooses. That is exactly what occurred in this case. The court considered those funds, 
and determined that they were not ongoing income for purposes of awarding fees. 
Crompton does not require that the court utilize the equity in the home, it simply gives the 
court the discretion to do so, should it so desire. 
All of the cases cited by Lori show that the trial court has the ability to consider 
equity in a marital home for the fashioning of awards, and have upheld those awards as 
within the discretion of the court. Nothing in those cases requires the court to determine 
that equity in a home is income for purposes of awarding fees. Such a determination will 
be upheld on appeal, but it is not an absolute requirement. It follows that if the court has 
the discretion to consider and include equity, then it also has the discretion to consider 
and exclude those funds in determining income for purposes of awarding fees. 
II. A TRIAL COURT'S DETERMINATION OF THE 
REASONABLENESS OF ATTORNEY'S FEES IS WITHIN THE 
DISCRETION OF THE COURT 
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The trial court made findings related to the reasonableness of the fees awarded to 
Lori. The court outlined specific concerns regarding the amount of attorney's fees being 
requested by Lori. (Findings of Fact and Amended Decree of Divorce, f 65-71). It is 
clear that the decision regarding fees is within the discretion of the court, so long as that 
decision is supported by adequate findings. See Andrus v. Andrus, 2007 UT App 291, 
1fl9, 169P.3d754. 
In support of her contention that the court's finding of excessive fees Lori points to 
the case of Rappleye v. Rappleye, 855 P.2d 260 (Utah App. 1993). This case is clearly 
distinguishable from the present case. In Rappleye the court of Appeals had insufficient 
findings to support the initial award of fees, and remanded the issue for findings 
regarding the reasonableness of the award. In the present case the court made findings 
about the reasonableness of the fees, and determined that the fees were unreasonable. 
Matthias does not disagree that the fees are unreasonable. The court found that they 
were unreasonable, and provided findings related to why the fees were unreasonable. 
This is within the discretion of the court, and the findings were adequate to support a 
determination that the fees were excessive. Therefore the finding of excessive fees is 
within the discretion of the court, and ought to be upheld. 
III. THE SPECIFIC FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT SUPPORT A 
DETERMINATION BY THE COURT THAT LOWS ATTORNEY'S 
FEES ARE EXCESSIVE 
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Lori argues that the finding of the court that the amount of fees charged by her 
attorney is excessive is in error because the trial court found that the fees incurred by 
Matthias were approximately one fifth of those incurred by Lori. She would have this 
court believe that the only piece of evidence considered in making such a finding was a 
statement made by counsel for Matthias. What Lori fails to address is the findings of the 
court related to the difficulty of the litigation, the efficiency of the presentation of the 
case, the number of exhibits which were created and not used, the finding of her counsel's 
fee being above the norm, and that the fees are excessive. Findings of Fact and 
Amended Decree of Divorce, f 68-71, 74. This determination of excessive fees is 
supported, and based upon the findings made by the court. See Foote v. Clark, 962 P.2d 
52, 55 (Utah 1998) 
The findings of the trial court support the determination that the fees were 
excessive. The cases cited by Lori all discuss instances where the trial court made 
insufficient findings related to the award of fees and the reasonableness of the fees. In 
the present case the trial court did make findings related to the reasonableness of the fees. 
The findings related to the fees show consideration of more than the finding that Lori's 
fees were considerably more than Matthias' fees. This was one of multiple factors 
considered, but was clearly not the determinative factor, despite Lori's assertions to the 
contrary. 
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CONCLUSION 
Matthias respectfully requests, based upon the foregoing, that this court not 
overturn the trial court's finding of excessive fees. Additionally, Matthias asks that this 
court affirm the trial court's determination, which was within the discretion of the court, 
to refuse to consider Matthias' equity in the marital home for determination of an ability 
to pay attorney's fees. 
STATEMENT CONCERNING ADDENDUM 
Pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 24(A)(11), Matthias states that no addendum is 
necessary inasmuch as Matthias has previously submitted an addendum. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED t h i s ^ d a y ofQcT\ck)er, 2010 
ROSEMONDf BLAKELOCK 
Attorney for Appellant 
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